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A. Summary of findings 
 
1. There is a presumption that national courts are primarily responsible for the 
prosecution of serious international crimes. International or internationalized 
criminal courts should step in only when the national institutions fail in this respect. 
In some cases, the international criminal courts have primacy while in others they 
may only exercise jurisdiction when the shortcomings of the national system have 
been established, an approach described as ‘complementarity’. Formulation of the 
relationship suggests tension and conflict but in practice it is often marked by 
cooperation and even synergy, a feature insufficiently developed in the Updated 
Set of Principles. Obligations of cooperation are also fundamental because the 
international institutions cannot function if they are unable to obtain evidence and 
secure the custody of suspects. The obligations result from a tangled web of 
international treaties of general application, international human rights instruments, 
customary norms and detailed provisions of the statutes of the relevant international 
bodies. 
 
B. Contextual and Historical Introduction 
 
2. International and ‘internationalized’ criminal courts are a recent phenomenon by 
contrast with national courts that have existed since ancient times. Isolated 
examples of criminal trials with an international dimension have been found in 
medieval times but the real beginnings of international and internationalized courts 
in the sense we understand them today dates to little more than a century. From the 
early nineteenth century there are many examples of international arbitration 
tribunals with authority to rule on disputes between States. They are the forerunners 
of the permanent institutions of the twentieth century, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The role of these 
bodies in addressing impunity should not be overlooked. In some cases they have 
managed to confront issues that have largely escaped national and international 
criminal courts. For example, in its famous advisory opinion on the Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ might be said to have acted in some sense 
like an international truth commission. 
3. The international and internationalized criminal tribunals with jurisdiction over 
individuals for war crimes and other atrocities can be traced to efforts at the end of 
the First World War under the Treaties of Versailles and Sèvres although the 
institutions were never actually set up. After the Second World War, two 
international military tribunals, one located in Nuremberg and the other in Tokyo, 
held trials of major war criminals. A permanent international criminal court was 
contemplated in the 1948 Genocide Convention but its establishment was delayed 
for half a century. In the early 1990s, as international law focused greater attention 
on problems of impunity and accountability for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights, the United Nations Security Council set up 
international criminal tribunals with respect to the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and, several years later, Sierra Leone. The United Nations 
also created judicial mechanisms as part of its larger administration of the territories 
of East Timor and Kosovo, and negotiated an agreement with Cambodia regarding 
‘extraordinary’ chambers of its national courts in which foreign judges and 
prosecutors participated. Negotiation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) concluded in 1998. It entered into force in 2002 and the Court 
soon began its judicial activities. 
4. The Set of Principles uses the terms ‘international and internationalized criminal 
tribunals’ but does not define them. Shortly before the Set of Principles was 
adopted, the Secretary-General issued his Report on The rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies where reference is made to ‘a wide 
range of special criminal tribunals’ including ‘ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals’, ‘mixed tribunals’, and national courts where there is international 
participation. Elsewhere in the same document he refers to ‘international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals’. It is beyond the scope of this Commentary to parse all of the 
distinctions that arise from this terminology. There is no great difficulty with the 
concept of ‘international criminal tribunals’ because these must be set up by 
mechanisms of international law, namely treaties (the case of the ICC and the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone) and by decision of the United Nations Security 
Council (the case of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). 
There is probably no entirely satisfactory formula for identifying ‘internationalized 
criminal tribunals’. Diane Orentlicher described ‘a new breed of court comprising 
both national and international elements, a trend exemplified by the establishment 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in 
Timor-Leste, and courts in Kosovo established under the authority of the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; and the likely establishment of 
other internationalized courts, including the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia’.1 Participation of foreign judges is probably too broad a criterion 
given that this is a rather common feature of many national jurisdictions, notably 
those of the Commonwealth. Nor is the fact that they exercise jurisdiction over 
serious international crimes because Principle 20 specifically deals with the 
obligation of national courts to exercise jurisdiction over such offences. Principle 
20 juxtaposes national courts with international and internationalized courts, 
suggesting some sort of coexistence. But probably what was envisaged was the 
operation of international or internationalized criminal courts even in the total 
absence of national courts capable of exercising concurrent jurisdiction, as was the 
case in East Timor and Kosovo for some time. 
 
C. Theoretical Framework 
 
5. Principle 20 is one of three provisions of the guidelines in Part III, which is entitled 
‘The Right to Justice’. Within that Part there are two subheadings. Principle 20 falls 
under the second of them, entitled ‘Distribution of jurisdiction between national, 
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foreign, international and internationalised courts’. Principle 20 is concerned with 
‘international and internationalized courts’. It governs the relationship between 
such institutions and ‘national courts’. The role of ‘foreign’ courts exercising 
universal jurisdiction appears to be reserved for Principle 21. ‘Serious crimes under 
international law’ are defined at the beginning of the Set of Principles. 
6. The word ‘impunity’, defined at the beginning of the Updated Set of Principles, 
implies punishment or some similar sanction. It inexorably directs us towards 
judicial activity of criminal courts or the lack of it. It may therefore seem surprising 
that so little attention in the Updated Set of Principles is devoted to the work of 
courts and tribunals. Bringing perpetrators to account also involves ‘civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings’ but references to persons being 
‘accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties’ 
leaves little doubt that criminal justice is at the core of the issue of impunity. 
7. The first sentence of Principle 20 is addressed to the national justice system. It 
affirms that it ‘remains the rule’ that States have primary responsibility in this 
regard. The language echoes recital 6 of the preamble of the Rome Statute, 
‘recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over 
those responsible for international crimes’. This duty stems from two sources. In 
various forms, treaties dealing with international crimes impose an obligation upon 
States parties to investigate and prosecute offences as well as to cooperate with 
other States that are prepared to exercise criminal jurisdiction. Examples include 
article 5 of the Genocide Convention and the grave breach provisions of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions (Arts 49-50/50-51/129-130/1456-147) and Additional 
Protocol I (Arts 11 and 85). More recent treaties like the UN Torture Convention 
and the UN Convention on Enforced Disappearance also contain provisions to this 
effect. It can be argued that the obligation also exists under customary international 
law. Moreover, the requirement that States investigate and prosecute serious 
international crimes is a corollary of their duty to address all serious crimes against 
the person imposed by international human rights law, in particular as a 
consequence of the protection of the right to life and the prohibition of ill-treatment. 
This has been regularly confirmed in case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee. 
8. The second sentence of Principle 20 is addressed to the international and 
internationalized criminal tribunals. It states that they may exercise ‘concurrent 
jurisdiction’ in two circumstances: when national courts cannot offer satisfactory 
guarantees of independence and impartiality or when they are materially unable or 
unwilling to conduct effective investigations or prosecutions. This phrase must be 
understood as being permissive rather than as an exhaustive enumeration of 
conditions under which international and internationalised courts may exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
9. Some international criminal tribunals operate on the basis of primacy, meaning that 
when they decide to proceed, the national court must defer to them. The ad hoc 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda function on this basis. The rule of 
primacy is set out in their Statute which is an annex to a Security Council decision. 
Accordingly, the national court must decline jurisdiction where the international 
court opts to proceed. The other approach is designated ‘complementarity’. Set out 
in detail in article 17 of the Rome Statute, it requires the ICC to declare a case 
inadmissible and defer it to the national jurisdiction unless the latter is unwilling or 
unable to investigate and prosecute the case. Amongst other criteria, article 17 says 
that unwillingness may be established if proceedings ‘were not or are not being 
conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice’. 
10. Whether primacy or complementarity is adopted, there must also be a rule to 
prevent a second prosecution for the same offence. Known as the ne bis in idem 
principle, it is set out in several human rights instruments including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Protocol No. 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Statutes of international criminal tribunals 
generally prevent the bis in both directions, blocking prosecution at the national 
level where the case has been finally judged by the international tribunals as well 
as preventing the international tribunal from proceeding if there is a final judgment 
at the national level. 
11. The final sentence of Principle 20 requires that States ‘fully satisfy their legal 
obligations’ with respect to international and internationalized criminal tribunals. 
This refers generally to cooperation in the investigation of alleged crimes, the 
apprehension of suspects and their transfer to the international jurisdiction. Very 
detailed rules in this area are set out in Part 9 of the Rome Statute. Problems may 
arise in this respect when a suspect may have a claim to immunity, a matter 
governed by special rules of international law. In 2002, the ICJ said that rules 
governing head of state immunity do not apply before ‘certain international 
criminal tribunals’, citing the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals for the former 




12. Failure of the national jurisdiction to observe the obligation to bring perpetrators to 
justice is at the root of international concerns with the problem of impunity. This 
has led to the establishment of international and internationalized courts. The legal 
obligation to prosecute is rarely debated before national courts. They are reluctant 
to intervene with the discretion of prosecutors. In many jurisdiction prosecution is 
conditional upon some sort of political approval or authorisation. Probably many 
cases that fulfil the terms of serious international crimes are in fact dealt with at the 
national level as ordinary crimes. There is barely a trace, in national jurisdiction, of 
the obligation set out in the treaties. For example, although the Geneva Conventions 
have been nearly universally ratified, there have been essentially no prosecutions 
at the national level for grave breaches. 
13. Principle 20 has been violated in some cases by the United Nations Security 
Council itself. In a perverse application of article 16 of the Rome Statute, two 
resolutions of the Council blocked the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-party States. On the two occasions when the Council has referred 
situations to the Court, pursuant to article 13b of the Statute, it has carved out 
exceptions and required that certain suspects be brought to justice only before the 
courts of their nationality. Such a requirement is incompatible with obligations 
under the relevant treaties, including the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide 
Convention. 
14. Respect for the obligation to transfer suspects to the international institutions has 
generally depended upon political factors. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, 
there was considerable evidence to indicate that some States or elements within 
their government and military establishments were assisting persons in the evasion 
of justice. When suspects were brought to the ICTY in The Hague, there was 
obstruction in the production of relevant evidence. The fact that the Rwandan 
Tribunal focussed its prosecutions on members of the former regime meant that 
cooperation at the national level was generally more forthcoming. 
15. Similar patterns present themselves in the work of the International Criminal Court. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo willingly transferred suspects who led anti-
government militias. In Kenya, on the other hand, where senior officials including 
the country’s President were charged, the Prosecutor ultimately admitted defeat, 
contending that official connivance prevented the production of evidence and the 
protection of witnesses. 
16. In contrast with the primacy of the ICTY and ICTR, the complementarity of the 
ICC has manifested itself in serious contestation at the international level. Where 
governments did not contest the matter, it was sometimes the accused who argued 
that the case should remain at the national level. But some shrewd accused persons 
seem to have calculated that they were better off in The Hague. The result in the 
case of Thomas Lubanga, for example, was that the admissibility of the case was 
essentially conceded by all concerned parties. In Libya, on the other hand, a Pre-
Trial Chamber gave the national authorities the chance to deal with the prosecution 
of a former official. 
17. Immunities have occasionally proven to be an obstacle although their importance 
may have been exaggerated. Only a handful of the many hundreds of suspects who 
have been charged at the international level had an arguable claim to immunity. 
The notion is offensive but in practice it has little impact on the operation of the 
international criminal courts. 
 
E. Critical Assessment 
 
18. During the late 1990s and the first decade of the new century, at any given time 
there were many trials underway at the international level. This has declined 
because of the closing of the ad hoc institutions for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone and the poor level of productivity of the ICC. This does not 
necessarily signal a more acute problem of impunity, however. Recent years have 
also shown a heightened attention to national prosecutions including the 
establishment of more robust and focussed domestic institutions. In the States of 
the former Yugoslavia, as the work of the tribunal progressed, there were renewed 
initiatives at the national level, including the established of specialized tribunals 
with international involvement. The ICTY developed a practice of transferring less 
important cases to the national courts. There were somewhat similar developments 
in Rwanda. Before authorising transfer to the national courts, the ICTR  insisted 
upon significant judicial reforms at the domestic level. 
19. Principle 20 may suggest a relationship of tension and conflict between the national 
and the international criminal courts. But at the ICC, the adjective ‘positive’ was 
affixed to the term ‘complementarity’, denoting a more benign and constructive 
relationship between the two levels. To some extent, then, the national and the 
international are not rivals but rather partners in the campaign against impunity. 
This dimension is not sufficiently developed within the Updated Set of Principles. 
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